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The Treaty on the European Union (EU) stipulates that one of the key objectives of the Union is to 
provide citizens with a high level of safety within an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
Given the fact that the fight against terrorism is a prominent aspect of this general objective, it is 
remarkable that, in spite of its political relevance and decade-long history, it has only relatively 
recently received due attention in the academic community1. Only a handful of post-9/11 edited 
volumes and special issues have focused on specific aspects of the EU counterterrorism efforts2 and 
initial monographs on the subject have only been relatively recently published by the three editors 
behind this special issue: Argomaniz3 has produced a theoretically informed assessment of the 
coherence of the EU response, Bures4 has examined the extent to which the EU can offer an added 
                                                          
1 A selection of relevant contributions would include:  Monica den Boer and JörgMonar, ‘Keynote Article: 11 
September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40/4 (2002), pp. 11-28; John Occhipinti, The Politics of EU Police Cooperation: Towards a European 
FBI?(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Edwin Bakker ‘Differences in Terrorist Threat Perceptions in 
Europe’, in DieterMahncke and JörgMonar (eds.) International Terrorism.A European Response to a Global 
Threat? (Brussels: P.I.E Peter Lang, 2006); Daniel KeohaneThe EU and counter-terrorism (London: CER, 
2005); DoronZimmermann, D., “The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal”, Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism, 29/1, (2006),pp. 123-145; OldrichBures, ‘EU Counterterrorism: A Paper Tiger?’, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 18/1 (2006),pp. 57-78; David Spence (ed.), The European Union and 
Terrorism (London: John Harper, 2007); BjörnMüller-Wille, ‘The Effect of International Terrorism on EU 
Intelligence Co-Operation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46/1 (2008), pp. 49–73; Raphael Bossong, 
‘The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism: A Flawed Instrument of EU Security Governance’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 46/1 (2008), pp. 27-48; Javier Argomaniz, ‘Post-9/11 Institutionalisation of European 
Union Counterterrorism: Emergence, Acceleration and Inertia’, European Security, 18/2 (2009), pp. 151-172; 
Christian Kaunert,‘The External Dimension of EU Counterterrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and 
Institutions’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22/1 (2010), pp. 41-61; Sarah Léonard, ‘The Use and 
Effectiveness of Migration Controls as a Counterterrorism Instrument in the European Union’, Central 
European Journal of International and Security Studies, 4/1 (2010), pp. 32-50. 
2See: CyrileFijnaut, Jan Wouters and Frederick Naert (eds.) Legal Instruments in the Fight Against International 
Terrorism: a Transatlantic Dialogue(Leiden: Nijhoff, 2004); Dieter Mahncke and JörgMonar (eds.) 
International Terrorism: A European Response to a Global Threat? (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2006); David 
Spence (ed.) The European Union and Terrorism (London: John Harper Publishing, 2007); Geoffrey Edwards 
and ChristophO. Meyer, ‘Introduction: Charting a Contested Transformation’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 46/1 (2008), pp. 1-25; Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira and Bruno Oliveira Martins, ‘The external dimension 
of the European Union’s counter-terrorism:an introduction to empirical and theoretical developments’, 
European Security,iFirstarticle (2012),pp. 1-15. 
3 Javier Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-Terrorism. Politics, polity and policies after 9/11 (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011).   
4OldrichBures, EU Counterterrorism Policy: a Paper Tiger? (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011) 
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value in the fight against terrorism in Europe and Kaunert5 has studied how counter-terrorism has 
been a driver in the process of construction of the EU’s AFSJ.   
Given these substantive efforts, this special issue suggests that an analysis of the successes and 
failures of the EU’s involvement in this field is imperativeand we believe this is a particularly 
pertinent momentto take stock of progress. The goal of this special issue is therefore to look back at 
the past decade and answer the question of whether, when it comes to the measures taken to combat 
terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, the EU has lived up to thepromise made in its founding treaties.  
The editors believe that adopting this long term perspective contributes to our understanding of the 
subject by permitting the individual contributors to this special issue to reveal general trends and to 
draw upon their accumulated expertise in order to produce a thorough assessment of the outcomes of 
the EU efforts to combat terrorism since 9/11. In order to ensure unity of purpose, an editorial meeting 
was held in November 2011 in the context of an International Workshop at the University of St 
Andrews that was generously funded by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence 
(CSTPV). The result of those fruitful exchanges is this special issue: a volume that presents the views 
of leading experts casting a critical eye over the EU performance, recognising achievements but also 
being suitably critical when realities did not match the European rhetoric.  
Although “counterterrorism” is not yet a clearly defined area in its broadest and fullest sense, it 
already spans across a number of other policy areas across all of the EU’s former three pillars. Thus, 
right from the start, the consensus was to adopt a broadly sectoral approach for this interim 
evaluation, independently examining policy outputs from some of the main components of the 
European Union’s multifaceted fight against terrorism. These include the exchange of information 
between police and intelligence agencies, the protection of critical infrastructure, the development of 
external action, the production of counter-terrorism legislation, the control of European borders and 
the fight against terrorist recruitment and financing. As a general rule, all articles in this special issue 
have attempted to determine the extent to which the EU has put in practice its own policy plans since 
9/11, all articles discuss the political and institutional factors behind successes and failures, and, when 
needed, present lessons learned and forward-looking recommendations. To complement these efforts, 
several contributions have also followed a thematic approach to matters such as the evolving 
importance of institutional actors for EU counter-terrorism, the impact of these policies on national 
systems and the centrality accorded to intelligence efforts in the European response. Thus, although 
the conceptual approaches have varied between the contributing experts, the general goal has 
remained to provide an indication of how EU counterterrorism relates back to the changing nature of 
the phenomenon of terrorism.  
What this special issue has not attempted to achieve, however, is an evaluation of the effectiveness of 
these policies. Although the editors have raised this issue at the editorial meeting, it soon became 
obvious that quantifying effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies is not only beyond the reach of 
this project but perhaps also of the field of terrorism research. There have been few attempts at 
providing evaluations of counter-terrorism interventions at the national leveland even fewer 
methodologically ambitious ones6. This can be explained, amongst other factors, by the absence of 
                                                          
5Christian Kaunert, European Internal Security: Towards Supranational Governance in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice? (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 2010) 
6 See: Richard J. Chasdi, Counterterror Offensives for the Ghost War World: The Rudiments of 
Counterterrorism Policy (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010); Cynthia Lum andLeslie W. Kennedy (eds.) 
Evidence-based Counter-terrorism Policy (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012); Gary La Free, Laura Dugan and Raven 
Korte, ‘The Impact of British Counter-terrorist Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing 
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sufficient evidence to measure impact due to the unavailability of sensitive data, as well as by the lack 
of consensus on how ‘effectiveness’ should be gauged.7 This is due to the methodological difficulties 
of finding the right proxy indicators that would complement the few available, yet inherently limited 
quantifiable criteria (such as the number of arrests, requests for assistance, or amounts of frozen 
terrorist money) that do not shed much light on the actual effects of counterterrorism measures on 
specific cultures, groups and individuals – as virtually all contributions in this special issue confirm, 
even the most “efficient” counterterrorism measures increasing the overall security may be 
problematic due to their impact on other important values such as liberty and justice. An additional 
and EU-specific obstacle is the multilevel system of governance involving national, sub-national and 
supranational actors, which complicates attemptsof tracing back the origin of specific outcomes to 
certain policies and/or actors.  
The high density of factors affecting the incidence of terrorist violence and the difficulty in isolating 
the short and long term impact of individual variables has clear implications for counter-terrorism, 
both at the domestic and international level. It undermines the capacity that national and supranational 
actors have in other public policy arenas to deliver evidence-based policies that are sustained by 
meaningful cost-effectiveness analyses and whose overall impact and implications can be measured in 
a thorough and credible manner. In other words, not having clear indicators of the extent to which a 
counter-terror initiative works -or does not- towards a specific goal affects whether counter-terror 
actors allocate their resources in a sensible manner. The repercussions deriving from these limitations 
are evident in ‘real-life’ counter-terrorism: from existing scepticism on the value of European 
governments’ counter-radicalisation efforts8 to the debates on whether the effect of the targeted killing 
of jihadists by US drone campaigns are more than counterbalanced by their impact on anti-American 
feelings in the region and the increase in domestic opposition due to their corrosive effect on human 
rights and international and US law9.     
Finally, it is also important to note that with the exception of the EU’s Counterterrorism Coordinator, 
none of the EU agencies and institutions discussed in this volume has a counterterrorism-only 
mandate. Similarly, many of the legal instruments utilized in the fight against terrorism are general 
anti-crime measures. Thus, following Mark Rhinard, ArjenBoin, and Magnus Ekengren, we believe 
that it is important to keep in mind that there are actually three levels of abstraction of EU’s 
counterterrorism capacities: 
1. Capacities explicitly engineered toward the fight against terrorism; 
2. Capacities directed toward managing complex threats and natural disasters in general; 
3. Capacities found in EU institutions that may help national agencies, of any type, respond to 
adverse events.10 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Deterrence and Backlash models’, Criminology, 47/1 (2009), pp. 17-45; Gary La Freeet al.,Modeling the 
Effectivenessof Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, (University of 
Maryland: START Research Report, 2011).  
7See: Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy,  and Alison Sherley,‘Are counter-terrorism strategies effective? The 
results of the Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism evaluation research’,Journal of Experimental 
Criminology, 2 (2006), pp. 489-516; Peter S. Probst, Measuring success in countering terrorism: Problems and 
pitfalls,in Paul B. Kantor et al (Eds.) Intelligence and Security Informatics(Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2005), pp. 
316-321. 
8Anthony Richards, ‘the problem with ‘radicalization’: the remit of ‘Prevent’ and the need to refocus on 
terrorism in the UK’, International Affairs, 86/4 (2010), pp. 143-152. 
9Ken Dilanian(2012) In legal battle against drone strikes, she's on the front lines, LA Times, 9 October., 
10 Mark Rhinard, ArjenBoin, and Magnus Ekengren, ’Managing Terrorism: Institutional Capacities and 
Counter-Terrorism Policy in the EU’, in David Spence(ed.) The European Union and Terrorism (London: John 
Harper Publishing, 2007), pp. 88-104. 
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This further complicates all scholarly attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of EU policies in the area 
of counterterrorism: “It is hard to predict how the EU can and will employ the tools explicitly 
designed for counterterrorism purposes, it is impossible to foresee if and how the Union will employ 
its generic tools that were originally designed for other purposes.”11 
Taking all of the aforementioned caveats and reservations into account, we decided that rather than to 
focus just on effectiveness, which the contributors to this special issue address in those areas where the 
aforementioned problems could be reasonably tackled (e.g. in the fight against terrorist financing, 
where at least some relevant data is publicly available), our primary criterion of progress is presence: 
the materialisation and development of EU policies and their translation into national systems and the 
establishment of institutional actors with the necessary powers and resources to fulfil the objectives 
laid out in the official EU strategy documents. In other words, the objective is to look at the existence 
of policies at the EU level and then, when possible, to reach a conclusion based on available evidence 
on whether these initiatives have had -or had the future potential to- make a difference on the  ground.  
The distinction between presence and effectiveness is clear when seen in the context of the process of 
bureaucratic development that has occurred in this area. Clearly, there has been a dramatic growth in 
the past decade on the number of EU bodies engaged in counter-terrorism at different levels. 
Individual contributions have richly illustrated this point.  For instance, Occhipinti has outlined 
Europol’s growing competencies and resources in the post-9/11 environment and their working 
relationship with Eurojust and Frontex. Bures has examined the role of committees such as the EU 
Clearing House in channelling the EU’s fight against terrorism financing. Argomaniz has listed a long 
list of bureaucratic actors (i.e. ENISA, CIWIN,AVSEC, MARSEC and others) that are working on 
protecting critical infrastructures from man-made attacks. Bakker has examined the work of the 
European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER) when critically analysing the EU’s approach. 
Kaunert, Leonard and McKenzie have concentrated on the European Parliament’s role whereas Monar 
has referred to the work of the EU Counter-terror Coordinator and closely examined the myriad of 
Council committees working on the external dimension of the threat. In parallel, den Boer has looked 
at Sitcen/Intcen when producing a fine-grained analysis of the transparency and accountability 
challenges associated with the sharing of intelligence at the European level.                 
This is of course far from a complete list. So clearly the EU has succeeded –mainly, but by no means 
only- through this process of bureaucratic development to achieve recognition and visibility. Yet we 
take great pains to separate in our argument prominence from impact and sustain the point that the 
mushrooming of relevant actors at the European level should not be assumed uncritically as having in 
principle a direct and substantial contribution to a stronger counter-terror response in practice. 
Overall, we believe that by following this approach the special issue offers a more nuanced view of 
the EU counterterrorism policy than those currently presented by its enthusiastic supporters and its 
unyielding critics. 
 
The post-9/11 significance of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor  
The consensus view in this volume is that the European Union has accomplished a surprising amount 
in the past ten years.  From a position of almost total irrelevance, and, as a reaction to the terrorist 
attacks in New York, Madrid and London, the Union has become increasingly active in the field of 
counter-terrorism. Using a set of policy programmes, strategy documents and list of priorities as 
                                                          
11Ibid., 99. 
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foundations, the European Union has aimed to coordinate member states’ policies, to harmonise 
national legislation and even to support some operational work conducted by national authorities.  
In this respect the ambitions and number of EU policy framework documents in the post-9/11 EU 
environment look impressive on paper. Already in November 2001, the European Council adopted an 
Action Plan on Combating Terrorism and an EU Counterterrorism Strategy was agreed in December 
2005, following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. The general Strategy was soon 
complemented by others on radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism and terrorist financing.  In 
December 2003, the European Council also adopted a European Security Strategy, where terrorism 
heads the list of threats facing the Member States and which proclaims that concerted European action 
against terrorism is ‘indispensable’, a call that was renewed in its 2008 update. Terrorism is also a key 
element in the 2010 Internal Security Strategy. It is no surprise that in a 2010 European Commission 
stocktaking exercise on EU measures specifically aimed at fighting terrorism, a conservative estimate 
would put the number of initiatives spanning across all of the EU’s former three pillars to more than 
80.12 
The above successes have been trumpeted by EU institutions themselves. According to Max-Peter 
Ratzel, the former Director of Europol: ‘The abortive London attacks of August 2006 … showed that 
the concerted EU actions and counterterrorist policies proved to be effective when put to the test. This 
is some most recent success of EU counterterrorism efforts but a number of other terrorist cells have 
been dismantled throughout the EU and terrorist plans foiled as a direct result of the concerted EU 
actions and counterterrorism policies.’13 The first EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries has 
gone as far as to claim that the fight against terrorism is changing ‘the role and functioning of the 
European Union’ as it adopts an increasingly operational character in this area.14 All this would 
simply be unthinkable before 9/11 when the EU was a rather negligible actor in this area.15 
The contributions in this special issue offer a number of explanations for the emergence of the EU as 
an increasingly visible and important counterterrorism player over the last decade. To begin with, 
many contributors attribute much of the drive for the EU’s growing involvement in counterterrorism 
to the shocks produced by the major terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London. These attacks 
led to a change in the existing European perception of terrorism and of the instruments that the EU 
Member States should put in place to fight this security threat. Under this perspective, the political 
shock that these terrorist attacks represented led to strong public pressure for European leaders 
members to ‘do something’, and since the threat was publicly framed as transnational, national 
governments rapidly agreed of the need for coordinated European action.  
More specifically, Bakker notes in his contribution how the formulation of EU policies that aim to 
counter radicalisation and recruitment have been incident driven, a direct -and sometimes 
inconsistent- reaction to the bombings in Madrid and London, and we affirm that this observation can 
be firmly generalised to the entire of the European counter-terror response. Furthermore, as Monar 
                                                          
12 European Commission (2010) Commission Staff Working Paper: tacking stock of EU Counter-Terrorism 
Measures, COM(2010)386 final, 20 July 2010. 
13 Max-Peter Ratzel, ‘Europol in the Combat of International Terrorism’, in HuseyinDurmazet al.  (eds) 
Understanding and Responding to Terrorism (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007), p. 12. 
14Gijs De Vries, The European Union and the Fight Against Terrorism, Presentation of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Co-Ordinator at the Seminar of the Centre for European Reform (19.01.2006). Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/060119CenterEuropeanReform.pdf. 
15 FernandoReinares (ed.) European democracies against terrorism: governmental policies and 
intergovernmental cooperation (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2000); Peter Chalk (ed.) West European Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism. The Evolving Dynamic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,1996).   
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points out in his contribution, the transformation of the initial external crisis (the 9/11 attacks in the 
US) into sustained European action has undoubtedly been facilitated by internal and EU-specific 
enabling factors that have paved the way for the emergence of EU actorness in the fight against 
terrorism: the Lisbon treaty reforms that have empowered the Union in terms of competences and 
instruments (i.e. to sign agreements on terrorism with other third countries), the development of 
internal institutional and legal capabilities (such as Europol, Eurojust, the Counter-Terror 
Coordination and others) and the emergence of a threat perception generating sufficient political will 
for common action. Although there are diverging views amongst the contributors about whether this 
threat perception is truly European, due to the fact that only some European countries have suffered 
from sustained terrorist campaigns within their borders, there is a general agreement on the view that, 
at least in the EU discourse, terrorism has been internalised as a ‘European threat’. This has allowed 
the EU to present a common discourse that has sustained political consensus and, to a degree, unity of 
action, despite this action being often concocted by only a small group of countries within the Union. 
In sum, as Monar observed, ‘threat perceptions and international collective action needs after the 9/11 
attacks have presented the EU with an ‘opportunity’ to assume new roles and responsibilities in a field 
in which it had before legally none and practically hardly any’. 
Other contributors to this special issue have highlighted that some internal enabling factors are a by-
product of the single market. Occhipinti, for example, shows how the freedom of movement by 
citizens and capital greatly facilitated the setting up of cross-border terrorist operations whilst 
allowing these networks to take advantage of differences in national antiterrorism laws and 
capabilities and existing gaps in international police and judicial cooperation. As a result, these 
developments have encouraged calls for increased national coordination and for the establishment of 
EU flanking measures.    
A number of contributions also revealed that encouragement for a more proactive EU role in 
counterterrorism has come from external actors. Bures for instance shows how the smart sanctions 
and the anti-money laundering approaches to counter terrorist financing adopted by the Union were in 
fact standards originally drafted by other international bodies such as the FATF. Likewise, Argomaniz 
has stressed the importance of the ICAO and IMO guidelines for the EU transport security policies. 
Finally, the importance of external pressure by the United States on the EU and the extent and 
ambition of the transatlantic security relationship has merited much attention in Monar’s and Kaunert, 
Leonard and Mackenzie’s papers.   
At the same time, this special issue confirms that most of the Union’s contribution to the fight against 
terrorism has been conducted within the borders of Europe. In fact, most experts have been generally 
rather sceptical about the EU’s external efforts. Despite the fact  that EU-US collaboration in counter-
terrorism has been seen as very substantial, sometimes even controversially so; in most other respects 
results have been considered modest due to the reluctance by member states, and even third countries 
targeted for support to engage with European institutions on these matters.16 In his up-to-date survey 
of this external dimension, however, Monar offers a more nuanced view by providing compelling 
evidence that the use of external relations instruments, such as political dialogues, counter-terrorism 
clauses, capacity building, economic assistance and others, has been a substantial part of the EU’s 
response to the post-9/11 terrorist challenges. In the process, the Union has been successful in 
                                                          
16See: Daniel Keohane (2008) ‘The Absent Friend: EU Foreign Policy and Counter-Terrorism’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 46/1 (2008), pp. 125-146; Hugo Brady, Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy: 
The EU’s role in counter-terrorism (London: CER, 2009); Rick Coolsaet, ‘EU counterterrorism strategy: value 
added or chimera?’, International Affairs, 86/4 (2010), pp. 857-873; WynRees,Transatlantic-Counter Terrorism 
Cooperation. The new imperative (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 
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achieving external actorness across three dimensions: ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’.  In 
other words, the EU has become increasingly accepted as a potential counter-terror partner on its own 
right by third-countries.      
Several contributions have also offered more theoretical insights and explanations for the growing 
role of the EU in counterterrorism. Occhipinti’s contribution, for example, puts special emphasis on 
the importance of institutional factors, especially in the field of police cooperation. Updating his 
seminal 2003 model on the supranationalisation of Justice and Home Affairs, and drawing on 
Kaunert’s work, he stresses the Commission’s influence as an interest shaper, a policy entrepreneur 
that has succeeded in weakening member states’ attachment to national sovereignty as the dominant 
norm for their relations with the EU in the AFSJ and, more specifically, counter-terrorism. Thus, the 
Commission has skilfully used the opening of windows of opportunity to push through legislation 
such as the European Arrest Warrant, which in reducing the average extradition period of serious 
crime suspects from more than 9 months to 45 days17, is perhaps the EU’s flagship Counter-terror 
measure in the past decade.  
Furthermore, Occhipinti has argued for the need to focus on other crucial institutional dynamics. He 
follows Argomaniz in highlighting the importance of path dependency. Argomaniz has contended that 
prior decisions made in the 1999 Tampere Council have constrained institutional actors’ reaction to 
9/11, and only following the Madrid and London attacks the Union has devised a more tailored 
approach to the threat. In parallel, Occhipinti convincingly argues that path dependency also helps to 
explain the transformation of Europol into a full-fledged European agency and stronger competencies 
for the Commission, EP, and the Court of Justice in the European fight against terrorism.   
In sum, it can therefore be argued that a combination of political and institutional factors explains the 
more visible position that the EU holds in comparison to its pre-9/11 self. As some contributors, and 
more specifically den Boer in the conclusion have noted, there is now a tapestry of legal instruments 
and institutional bodies with competencies in fighting terrorism at the European level and there is 
little doubt that these developments have significant ramifications, especially for the democratic 
oversight of the European counter-terrorism efforts. Arguably the most important issue in this regard 
is the oversight of EU counter-terrorism intelligence exchange which is hampered by a rather 
considerable list of challenges. Den Boer’s comprehensive account details amongst others the 
networked character of the intelligence, the duplication that comes from parallel bilateral exchange 
processes, the increasing implication of barely regulated private actors and the growing exchange of 
data with third countries with lower protection standards.  
If we turn the spotlight on the democratic accountability of the institutional actors, on the one hand 
Occhipinti has remarked the post-Lisbon de jure increases of parliamentary oversight over Europol, 
which now affords both the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments new authority over 
the agency. On the other hand, den Boer laments that lightly anchored agencies (SitCen/IntCen) or 
European-scale intelligence networks (PWGOT, Berne) have little or no accountability at all and, in 
addition to this, voids and gaps still exist when it concerns the specific responsibilities of these 
agencies, as in Europol’s work within the terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP).  
Using precisely TFTP as one of their case studies, Kaunert, Leonard and MacKenzie have illustrated 
the turnaround in the European Parliament’s fortune in its quest for greater democratic accountability 
for EU counter-terrorism. Arguably, the pre-Lisbon period saw the EP mostly limited to making 
                                                          
17 European Commission (2005) Commission evaluation report: the European arrest warrant has broadly 
achieved its objectives, Memo/05/58, 23 February 2005 
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exasperated (and often ignored) calls through its LIBE Committee for a counter-terrorism response 
that was more respectful of European citizens’ civil liberties and privacy rights. The introduction of 
co-decision in the AFSJ due to the Lisbon Treaty has finally transformed the European Parliament 
(EP) from a ‘critical but impotent actor in European Union counter-terrorism’ into a key player in the 
European decision-making process. This is one of the most significant developments in the field in the 
last decade, yet a slight shadow of a doubt remains on the EP capacity, or inclination, to take up the 
mantle for European citizens’ rights. The reason, the authors contend, is that its increased institutional 
power has forced the EP to recognise the need of becoming a responsible partner to the Council and 
behaving in a more co-operative manner. The need to engage in compromises such as that of the EU-
US SWIFT Agreement may detract from the EP’s reputation as an upholder of civil liberties.  
There is no question in any case of the importance of the security versus/and/or liberties question(s). 
The EP itself has lamented in a 2011 LIBE Committee report  how ‘mass surveillance has become a 
key feature of counter-terrorism policies’ and how ‘the large-scale collection of personal data, 
detection and identification technologies, tracking and tracing, data mining and profiling, risk 
assessment and behavioural analysis are all used for the purpose of preventing terrorism’.18 The 
concern is that these policies shift the burden of proof to the citizen while their actual effectiveness for 
the prevention of terrorism is far from proven.  It is also an open question whether some of these 
measures would pass a proportionality test.  In agreement with this report and the work of other 
scholars19, the editors therefore believe that the EU legitimacy as a counter-terror actor is dependent 
not only on the delivery of policies that are broadly seen as effective by others but also proportional to 
the threat and respectful of European democratic values.     
 
The light footprint of EU counter-terrorism 
It is clear from the above that the European Union is much better equipped today than it was ten years 
ago to provide an added value in the European fight against terrorism. This is an important finding in 
itself, with important ramifications for our understanding of international organisations as security 
actors. Yet a number of caveats should be registered regarding this verdict. For a start, as Leonard’s 
contribution remind us, not all the initiatives included in the long list of measures that appear in the 
periodic iterations of the EU Counterterrorism Action Plan have made a substantial contribution to the 
fight against terrorism. Leonard convincingly argues that, contrary to what the inclusion of border 
control measures in the Protect strand of the EU 2005 Counterterrorism Strategy seems to suggest, the 
importance of migration policies in the fight against terrorism has not been demonstrated yet and is in 
fact very difficult to assess. This is a key issue since terrorism concerns have served to justify 
politically the strengthening of migration controls, a process that has serious negative externalities: it 
makes more difficult to bona fidevisitors to travel and enter the EU, it has a harmful effect in 
community relations and it raises serious questions regarding data protection and privacy rights. 
Leonard’s paper also brings to the fore the sensitive question of whether some polices are included in 
the EU strategic C-T documents because they are evidence-based and policy relevant –rather than 
being based on assumptions- or because they fulfil the political demands of ‘demonstrating’ action, 
                                                          
18 European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, justice and Home Affairs (2011) Report on the EU 
Counter-terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges (2010/2311 (INI)), 20 July 2011, p. 7. 
19 See: Didier Bigo, and AnastassiaTsoukala(eds.),Terror, Insecurity and Liberty(London: Routledge, 2008); 
Elspeth Guild and Florian Geyer (ed.) Security versus Justice. Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European 
Union (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008); Thierry Balzacq and  Sergio Carrera,The EU’s Fight against International 
Terrorism - Security Problems, Insecure Solutions, Policy Brief 80,  (Brussels: CEPS, 2005) 
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especially in the face of political urgency. We question in this special issue the notion that all 
initiatives in the EU programmatic documents contribute to tackle terrorism. The examination in this 
volume of Border Control and Critical Infrastructure Protection policies have shown evidence of both 
mission and function creep and have raised questions of the extent to which the EU has deployed a 
focused and fully tailored approach to the threat.   
Moreover although the Union has achieved certain visibility and presence in the last decade, the 
contributors to this volume have often reminded us that the EU still plays mostly a subsidiary role to 
that of the Member States.  Across the counter-terror policy areas there is a running tension between 
the necessity to enhance cooperation and the reluctance of member states to relinquish competencies 
and, given the national security sensitivity of counter-terrorism, member states have generally  ‘kept 
the EU’s role under tight control and constraints’.20 
It must be noted however that this fundamental shortcoming in counter-terror cooperation is far from 
unique and mirrors in fact similar dysfunctions present in other internal security areas. Terrorism is 
nothing but a high profile example of the long running tension in EU Justice and Home Affairs 
between the notions of security and sovereignty. European national governments need to perform an 
uneasy balancing act between the growing –sometimes, urgent- demands for closer cooperation that 
come from the transnational character of some of these problems (i.e. organised crime, proliferation, 
illegal immigration) and the accompanying weariness and reluctance that characterises any initiative 
that leads to the delegation of more national power to Brussels. At the same time, it should always be 
noted that the political sensitivity and the intensity of media attention that accompanies the 
phenomenon of terrorism makes of course this tension both more visible and generally harder to 
accommodate.  Furthermore, EU’s influence on the way counter-terrorism action is conducted on the 
ground by member states remains extremely limited. Operational action is by and large a national 
responsibility, not only for national sovereignty reasons but also due to the principle of subsidiarity: 
even if there is an understanding that the threat is transnational, most national governments agree that 
it would make little sense to centralise police and intelligence efforts at the European level. National 
authorities have very much opposed this notion and, given this, Occhipinti draws upon Fägersten’s 
work to show how bureaucratic resistance by national authorities has hampered the development of a 
greater operational function for Europol in intelligence exchange. Such resistance is predicated on a 
bureaucratic culture in intelligence organisations that privileges isolation and secrecy and the 
difficulty to transfer to the international authorities the ‘personal and organizational networks - built 
over time, through experience and via hard-won trust – [that]are the backbone of international 
intelligence cooperation’. These factors have served as sources of ‘friction’ that have prevented 
intelligence cooperation in the EU from being realised to the extent wanted by decision makers.     
As a consequence, as several contributors have pointed out, the EU’s general role in counterterrorism 
has been often reduced to that of conveyor belt for best practices and knowledge sharing or a 
coordinator of efforts at most.  Yet, as Argomaniz highlights, the extent of the European engagement 
and the significance of the EU’s implication in national counter-terror responses also varies depending 
on the particular policy sector. While it is true for the core of effective counter-terrorism work (police, 
judicial and intelligence operations) EU institutions can ‘only’ aspire to enhance cooperation, there 
are other policy areas (i.e. aviation and maritime security, terrorism financing and others) where the 
EU had strong  pre-9/11 Community competencies derived from the Common Market.  In these fields, 
the EU has been a preeminent actor, at times even adopting the position of a primary regulator.   
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These are also policy areas where, as discussed by Argomaniz and Bures, the EU has had the need to 
engage in what is often referred to as public-private partnerships. In particular in the fight against 
terrorist financing, private financial institutions (FIs) have actually shouldered the bulk of the day-to-
day CTF burden when it comes to monitoring the billions of daily financial transactions and reporting 
the suspicious ones to public authorities for further investigation. Yet here we also find private actors 
being very reluctant to become partners to public authorities in the security arena, motivated as they 
are by different logics: ‘profit rather than security maximizers’ as Bures puts it. To a large extent, this 
is due to the fact that ‘public authorities have provided the private sector with only vague clues for 
detecting costumers and/or transactions that may be linked to terrorist financing while demanding that 
FIs put in place elaborate and costly surveillance mechanisms and procedures’. Moreover, these 
demands have been in fact counterproductive because the threat of penalties has motivated private FIs 
to resort to the over-reporting of suspicious transactions, a practice that has placed a large burden on 
the public Financial Intelligence Units that have had to process large amounts of data of dubious 
value. Similarly, Argomaniz explains how in the transport sector private actors have been very critical 
with the hefty economic costs that the increasing number of security rules they have to comply with 
represent. In fact they have lobbied hard European institutions to prevent the passing of new rules or 
to promote the phasing out of existing ones.    
Finally, following with Den Boer and Wiegand’s contribution, it is important to note that not all 
member states have been similarly affected by European legislation in this area. Those that had 
already in place strict antiterrorist provisions in their criminal law systems before 9/11 have been less 
influenced by supranational measures. Yet they find that supranational regulations in the field of 
criminal justice have had a ‘strong converging influence on nation states’. These ‘bubbles of 
convergence’ come from the fact that those states without a counter-terrorism legal regime (i.e. The 
Netherlands) or those with less developed systems (i.e. Italy and Germany) have had to ‘catch up’ 
with other countries, so similarities between states have grown. They caution, however, that, despite 
this approximation process, ‘the cultures, working procedures and priorities of the counter-terrorism 
organizations in the EU Member States still tend to be very different from one another’ with previous 
experience with terrorism and constitutional norms on the relationship between domestic and 
European legislation being important intervening variables in this process of convergence.    
 
Future prospects 
In addition to assessing the EU’s counterterrorism performance in the first post-9/11 decade, another 
ambition of this special issue is to comment on potential future developments and challenges based on 
the trends that we have observed in the last 10 years. In this period, it has become abundantly clear 
that counter-terrorism as an EU policy field has depended upon the break out of major terrorist attacks 
to generate the impetus to move forward. This implies the question of how the EU response will 
develop in the future in a time when, as Eurobarometer data shows, other socio-economic concerns 
have supplanted this security threat in the public’s mind and the matter has moved down in the 
political agenda. Moreover, this change is happening in a context where the available Europol data 
suggests that ’even if the threat of terrorist attacks remain ‘serious’ and ‘diverse’, there is a decreasing 
trend of attacks attributed to ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, a category that accounts for the vast 
majority of all terrorist incidents in Europe.21 This tendency has been further accelerated with the 
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2011 announcement of a permanent ceasefire by ETA, the oldest separatist terror group in Europe.22 
Thus, since even the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator has spoken of a ‘counter-terrorism fatigue’23, 
in the short term we expect the continuation of decision-making inertia, a far cry from the frenzy that 
met the bombings in New York, Madrid, and London.     
This piecemeal evolution can obviously be seen as rather problematic. We would like to argue, 
however, that the absence of major terrorist attacks should also be seen as an opportunity for the EU 
and its Member States to produce better thought out policies in the absence of public and political 
pressure. Since these policies face complex challenges and the dangers of over-reaction and 
unintended consequences, a more paused reflection based on in-depth analyses of the problem and the 
sharing of experiences and good practices could lead, we would hope, to better informed policies. 
Considering the controversy raised by some EU initiatives, this is certainly not a bad thing. Hence we 
follow Bakker in hailing the progressive move of the EU from an ‘incident driven counter-terrorism 
and counter-radicalisation policy to one that is based on an increasing collective body of knowledge 
and expertise’. 
As importantly, some contributors see an opportunity here to redress the post-9/11 emphasis on 
security with more attention being put on the consequences of these policies for European citizens’ 
liberties. As Occhipinti remarks, the increased importance of fundamental rights in the Lisbon Treaty 
and the goals of the Stockholm Programme seem to be a step on the right direction. Moreover, the 
new powers that Lisbon bestows to the European Court of Justice have widened its authority to 
protect the individual rights of European citizens. Firstly, the Commission can now initiate 
infringement proceedings and bring national governments before the ECJ in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Secondly, when requested by national courts, measures in 
this area are now automatically subject to preliminary rulings of the Court. 
As we have argued before, the post-Lisbon function of the EP as co-legislator and overseer will be 
fundamental in this regard. Here, whereas Occhipinti believes that the EP will ‘likely push for and 
gain greater safeguards regarding the handling of personal data and the creation of new systems and 
networks to store and share information about EU citizens’, Kaunert, Leonard and Mackenzie broadly 
agree with this prognosis , but at the same time, also highlight some obstacles for the future evolution 
of the EP’s as an active supporter of citizens’ privacy rights. This is an important question that 
remains open for the time being and would certainly merit continuous attention by scholars in the 
future.    
Another aspect that has received significant attention form the contributors has been the importance of 
international organisations (UN, ICAO, IMO,FATF and others) and the United States in spurring EU 
action in a wide variety of areas. There are little doubts that these external actors will remain drivers 
for further developments in the near future and even serve to encourage further action in new areas of 
very recent EU activity such as cybersecurity, as Argomaniz shows. At the same time, as Bures 
suggests in his contribution, the EU should take advantage of the current period of relative calm to 
reconsider its past practise of blind implementation of those external counterterrorism standards and 
practices that do not necessarily reflect the nature of the contemporary terrorist threat in Europe.    
Looking further in the future, most of the contributors to this special issues remain doubtful as to 
whether a holistic and coherent EU response to terrorism will be attainable. Argomaniz has brought 
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attention to the fragmented character of the EU policies on the protection of infrastructures from 
terrorist attacks and see these as an illustration of the broader consistency challenges that the EU faces 
in its response to the terrorist threat, a product amongst other factors of a complex bureaucratic 
structure that is made up of a multiplicity of committees, agencies and bureaucracies. Interestingly, 
we find on this question various predictions for the future depending on the policy sector. Thus, 
although Bakker sees positive steps in the anti-radicalisation field towards an approach that is more 
consistent and comprehensive, Monar finds that ‘institutional complexity and cross-policy 
coordination problems (between the external JHA dimension, the CFSP and external economic 
relations) continue to act as powerful constraints upon its external counter-terrorism role’. Likewise, 
Bures finds practical and political obstacles to the co-ordination demands that a comprehensive 
counter-terrorist financing approach at the EU level would require. It remains to be seen whether the 
EP calls for a holistic approach that would align both the external and the Internal Security Strategies 
and strengthen coordination mechanisms between Council JHA structures, European agencies and the 
European External Action Service24 will make a difference in light of the scale of the challenges.  
Finally, Monar posits, and the editors agree, that ‘it seems clear that the EU’s future role will as well 
heavily depend on the further development of its internal political legal and institutional counter-
terrorism framework’. At the same time, the further development of the EU AFSJ legal and 
institutional machinery to be applied to the fight against terrorism may not come as a reaction to 
terrorism itself but from other enabling internal factors. Occhipinti for instance sheds light on the 
spillover-enlargement effect and how a future expansion of the Schengen zone to Bulgaria and 
Romania and the enlargement into the western Balkans could exacerbate the challenges to the AFSJ 
from transnational crime. A ‘desire to find practical solutions to common challenges’ may bring not 
only the increased use of existing tools such as the Joint Investigation Teams but also the adoption of 
ambitious new mechanisms in the light of the new potentialities offered in key strategic documents 
such as the Internal Security Strategy and the Stockholm Programme.  
Although this special issue cannot offer answers to all of the aforementioned puzzling questions and 
dilemmas, its findings clearly challenge many of the commonly expressed views concerning the EU 
and its role in the fight against terrorism. We therefore hope that the readers of Intelligence and 
Security will find as much food for thought in the following articles as we did in the process of their 
production and revision.  
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